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NORTH DAKOTA'S NEW CONTEMPT LAW:
WILL IT MEAN ORDER IN THE COURT?
I. INTRODUCTION
The judicial use of the contempt of*court power has been a source
of confusion that has "plagued the legal profession for centuries."l
Much of this confusion arises from judicial attempts to classify
contemptuous conduct as either civil or criminal.2 Although, as one
writer notes, classification problems are not unique to contempt law, 3
"[n]owhere else is there such recurring confusion and mistake as here."4
In 1993, the North Dakota Legislature attempted to eliminate some
of this historic confusion by passing legislation which eliminates the
need to differentiate civil and criminal contempts. 5 The statute attempts
to achieve this by abandoning the use of these concepts, adopting instead
the more general concept of "contempt of court," for which either a
punitive or remedial sanction may be imposed.6 Thus, under the new
statute, courts are no longer required to determine whether contemptu-
ous acts are civil or criminal because they are merely contempts of court.
Nevertheless, upon concluding that a contempt has taken place, a court
will be faced with a decision as to the type of sanction it will seek to
impose upon the actor. 7 This decision is quite an important one because
it establishes the procedure that the court must follow during the
1. State v. Stokes, 240 N.W.2d 867, 870 (N.D. 1976).
2. See RONALD L. GOLOFARB, THE CoNTrrmr POWER 46-49 (1963) (discussing the confusion that
has been created as a result of classifications of contempt). In his book, Goldfarb wrote that "this
penchant for dividing contempts into categories and opposites has been typical and has grown to
confuse and often plague the common lawyer." Id. at 46. In Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe,
220 S.E.2d 672. 680 (W. Va. 1975), the court noted that the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt has long been an unsettled area of the law. Id. In fact, the court found that courts have
characterized various actions as either civil or criminal contempt "without regard to any readily
comprehensible theory." Id.
3. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 49.
4. Id. Goldfarb concluded that the confusion results from many things including "anomalous
historical precedent, senseless judicial tenacity, and continuous disagreement." Id. The confusion
which has resulted because of these classifications should prove the need for a thorough reevaluation
of contempt laws. Id.
5. N.D. CEirr. CODE ch. 27-10 (Supp. 1993). See also 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 89, § 1. By adopting
this legislation, North Dakota joined a handful of other states which had previously eliminated the
distinction between civil and criminal contempt. See, e.g., WiS. STAT. ANN. §§785.01-.06 (1981 &
West Supp. 1993); 1991 OR. LAWS ch. 724, § 32 (eliminating civil and criminal contempt in Oregon);
1989 WASH. LAWS, ch. 373 § 28 (abandoning the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt in
Washington state).
6. See N.D. C ENr. CODE § 27-10-01.1 (Supp. 1993) (defining actions only in terms of 'contempt
of court'). The North Dakota Supreme Court recently recognized, in a footnote, that the new statute
.redefines the specific conduct generically as 'contempt of court.'" State v. Mertz, 514 N.W.2d 662,
666 n. 3 (N.D. 1994).
7. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural aspects of the new
contempt law).
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contempt proceeding, which, in turn, ensures that all of the necessary
procedural safeguards are applied throughout the proceeding, and also
eliminates some of the risk that the court's findings will subsequently be
reversed on due process grounds.8
Besides the elimination of civil and criminal contempts, other
changes have also occurred. Several sections of the previous contempt
law were amended.9 Some of these amendments were undertaken to
remove the need for two contempt hearings in situations where the
contemnor was brought before the court on an order to show cause or a
writ of attachment. 10 Others were made to consolidate North Dakota's
contempt laws into one area of the Century Code, in an effort to make
the statutes more user-friendly.!" Where it was necessary to maintain
contempt provisions in other areas, those sections were amended to direct
the user back to the main contempt statutes for the applicable proce-
dure. 12
The purpose of this Note is to examine the changes introduced by
the 1993 Legislature and to predict the likelihood that the legislation will
be successful in addressing the problems which were found to have
existed under North Dakota's previous contempt of court statute. In
meeting this purpose, this Note will (I) provide a brief general discussion
of the contempt power, (II) analyze the problems which previously
existed under North Dakota law and the changes introduced by the
legislature to address them, (III) use Wisconsin's experience with a
substantially similar contempt statute to examine the likely problem
areas within the enacted legislation, and (IV) conclude with predictions
regarding the success of the new law.
II. THE CONTEMPT POWER IN GENERAL
A. ORIGINS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
Contempt of court may be defined as "[any act which is calculated
to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct [a] court in [the] administration of
8. Id.
9. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-15-35; 14-05-25.1; 14-06-03.1; 14-07.1-06; 14-08.1-05; 14-12.1-09;
14-17-09; 14-17-16; 27-09.1-07; 27-10-07 to -11; 17-10-13; 27-10-18 to -20; 27-10-23; 27-19-07;
27-20-55; 28-21-12.1; 29-10.1-39; 42-02-10 to -11; 51-15-06.1; 54-35-02(7) (Supp. 1993).
10. See infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text (examining the elimination of the need for two
hearings in some cases involving contempt).





justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity." 13
Under this definition, actions ranging from "trifling incidents" to "serious
criminal offenses" may subject one to punishment for contempt.14 The
judicial exercise of this power can be traced as far back as twelfth
century England.15 In fact, contempt has been a firmly established legal
concept since the fourteenth century.16
The contempt of court power is also a firmly established legal
concept in American courts. When the American colonists created their
government, they brought with them many of England's judicial
procedures and practices.17 One of these was the concept of contempt of
court. 18 Consequently, upon their creation, federal courts were vested
with the power to punish contempt.19 The same is true of most state
courts.
2 0
The power to punish contemptuous acts has loig been regarded as
"indispensable to the administration of the law," 2 1 for without it, courts
would be unable to preserve their orders or enforce their judgments. 2 2
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 319 (6th ed. 1990). See also In re MacKnight, 27 P. 336, 338
(Mont. 1891) (defining contempt of court simply as the "disregard of the authority of [a] court').
14. CROMWELL H. T HoAs. PRoai.EMvs OF CoNrEMPr OF COURT: A STuDY IN LAW AND PUBUC POUCY
1(1934).
15. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 9.
16. SIR JOHN C. Fox, THE HISTORY oFCoNTEmP' OF COURT: T HE FORUM OF TRIAL AND THE MODE OF
PuNs2ENrr 1 (1927).
.1-7. GOLOFARB, supra note 2, at 19. Mr. Goldfarb wrote that:
Since the American colonists were by and large a product of the common law
environment of England, it was very natural that their courts were endowed with
procedures copied from mother England. Though these settlers consciously went about
ameliorating many of the harsher aspects of English governmental practice, the general
contempt of court power was not among the changes.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. In Ex parte Robinson. 86 U.S. 505. 510 (1873). the Court stated that "[tihe moment the
courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject,
they became possessed of [the power to punish contempt]." Id. Federal courts were granted the
power to punish for contempt of court when they were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Judiciary Act, § 17. 1 Stat. 83 (1789). Section 17 of the Act endowed these courts with the power to
"punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause
or hearing before the same." I Stat. 83. In Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U. S. 204, 227-228 (1821), the
United States Supreme Court stated that "the Courts of justice of the United States are vested, by
express statute provision, with power to fine and imprison for contempts . . . ." See also Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1968) (discussing the original grant of contempt power given by the
Judiciary Act of 1789).
20. Steven M. Gloe, Contempt of Court: Some Considerations for Reform, 1975 Wis. L. REV.
1117, 1118 n.10 (1975) (noting that state courts are generally constitutional creatures). But see
GEORGIA CONST. art. 1, § 11, 5 IV (1983) (expressly limiting the contempt power of Georgia courts by
legislative action).
21. State v. Crum, 74 N.W. 992. 994 (N.D. 1898).
22. In Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505. 510 (1873), the Court wrote that:
[tihe power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts: its existence is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments.
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One commentator has concluded that without the contempt power, a
court would be reduced to "little more than a debating party dispensing
advisory opinions." 23 Thus, in order for a court to uphold its dignity
and authority, it must be permitted to punish those actions it deems
contemptuous 24 with fines, incarceration, or other appropriate penal-
ties.25
Recognizing the importance of the contempt power to their
function, courts early on concluded that the power to punish contempt
of court was inherent to their existence. 26 North Dakota's courts were no
exception. In State v. Crum,27 a unanimous North Dakota Supreme
Court wrote:
That the power exists to make the [contempt] orders in
question, no enlightened court can question. Such power is
indispensable to the administration of the law, and the exercise
of such power was contemplated by the people when, by their
constitution, they created courts, and conferred upon them
general jurisdiction in both law and equity.28
orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The
moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with
jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power.
Id. at 510. See State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 603 (Wis. 1928) (stating that without the contempt
powers courts would be unable to "accomplish the purposes of their existence."); Mama M.
Tess-Mattner, Contempt of Court: Wisconsin's Erasure of the Blurred Distinction Between Civil and
Criminal Contempt, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 369. 369 (1983) (discussing the importance of the court's
contempt power).
23. Gloe, supra note 20. at 1117.
24. See Baier v. Hampton. 417 N.W.2d 801. 804 (N.D. 1987).
25. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.4 (Supp. 1993) (defining the punishments available for
"punitive" and 'remedial' sanctions). For a more thorough discussion of sanctions, see infra section
III.
26. Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. at 510.
27. 74 N.W. 992 (N.D. 1898).
28. State v. Crum, 74 N.W. 992, 994 (N.D. 1898).
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The decision that the contempt power is an inherent one is
important, for it establishes that legislative action cannot be used to
eliminate it.29 Nevertheless, legislative action may be used to curtail the
court's use of the power by limiting, for example, the class of people to
which contempt orders apply, or the types of punishments which may be
29. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227-28 (1821). The Anderson court stated that
although the power of the courts to punish for contempt was vested within them by express statute, the
contempt power would exist even in the absence of these statutes. Id. at 226. Thus, statutes may only
curtail the courts' inherent power to punish for contempt. Id. Additionally, where legislative
regulation becomes burdensome on the court's ability to exercise its contempt power, the regulations
may run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. See THOMAS, supra note 14, at 75 (discussing the
separation of powers and regulation of the contempt power by legislative action). Thomas Cromwell
noted that in the majority of decisions striking down legislation which regulated or limited the court's
exercise of the contempt power, "it was generally laid down that one branch of the government could
not lawfully interfere with the powers of a coequal coordinate branch of government." Id.
Legislative ability to regulate the court's use of the contempt power may be greater where
the courts are created by a legislative grant rather than a constitutional one. Gloe. supra note 20, at
1118 n. 10. Nevertheless, state courts are generally constitutional creatures. Id. But see GEORGIA
CONST. art. I, § 11, para. 4 (expressly limiting the contempt power of Georgia courts by legislative
action). North Dakota's Constitution, for example, places all judicial power in a unified court system.
See N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1. The term "judicial power" as used in the constitution was later defined
by the North Dakota Supreme Court to include the power to punish contempts. Murphy v. Townley,
274 N.W. 857, 860-61 (N.D. 1937). Thus, the court determined that the contempt power was
constitutionally conferred. Id.
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used. 30 Examples of this type of regulation occur at both state31 and
federal levels.32
B. CLASSIFICATION OF CONTEMPT
Early in their history, courts found it necessary to classify
contempt. 33  The purpose for doing so was to allow the court to
determine the appropriate procedure to apply in sanctioning contemptu-
30. STEWART RAPAUE. A TREATISE ON CONTEMPT, § 11, at 14 (1884). See Murphy v. Townley,
274 N.W. 857 (N.D. 1937) (discussing the North Dakota legislature's ability to regulate contempt). For
an in-depth discussion of Congress' ability to regulate the federal contempt of court power, see Wilbur
Larremore, Constitutional Regulation of Contempt of Court, 13 HARV. L REV. 615 (1900).
31. See ALA. CODE §§ 12-1-8 to -11 (1986); A LASKA STAT. §§ 09.50.010 - .060 (1983); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-861 to -865 (1992); ARK. CODEANN. § 16-10-108 (Michie 1994); CAL CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 177-178, 1209-1222 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); CAL. PENALCODE § 166 (West Supp. 1994);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-1-121, 19-3-104, 19-7-104 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-33 to -35
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994), § 52-468 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1271-1272 (1987 &
Supp. 1992), § 4206-4207 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-.22 to .23 (West 1988), § 900.04 (West
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-105 (Harrison 1986 & Supp. 1993); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 710-1077 (1985);
IDAHO CODE §§ 7-601 to -614 (1990), § 44-710 to 711 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, ILCS 5/1-3
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-10-10 to -13, 34-4-7-1 to 34-4-9-3 (Bums 1986 & Supp.
1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 665.1 to .12 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20 -1201 to -1206 (1989);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.110, .140 (Michie 1992), § 432.230 to .250, .270-.290 (Michie 1985); LA.
CODECIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 221-227, 330 (West 1960 & Supp. 1994); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. arts.
17, 20-25 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 251-252 (West 1980 & Supp.
1993); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. §§ 1-202,12-304,12-402 (1989); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957
art. 38, § 4 (1993); MASS. G EN. LAWS ANN. ch. 220, §§ 13A-14 (West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 600.1701- .1745 (West 1981 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 588.01- .15, .20 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1994); Miss. CODEANN. §§ 9-1-17, 11-51-11 to -12 (Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 476.110 -
.160 (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3-1-501 to -523, 45-7-309 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
25-2121 to -2123 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 22.010- .140, 199.340 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1993); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 491:19- :20,495:2 (1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 10-1 to -8 (West 1987 & Supp.
1994), 2C: 29-9 (Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-2 to -5 (Michie 1990), 39-3-15(Michie 1991);
N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 750-781 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994): N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 215.50-.51, .54
(McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5A-II to -17. -21 to -25 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
27-10-01.1 to -01.4,27-10-07 to -13, -18 to -20, -23 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2705.01 -
.10 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. it. 21, §§ 26, 565-568 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 1.240 to 1.250,33.015 to 33.155 1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4132-4136 (1981 & Supp.
1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-6-1, -8-5, -8.1-3. -9-21, -10-38 to 38.1 (1985 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-1-150 to -170, -5-320 (Law. Co-op 1977); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. §§ 16-15-2 to -8
(1987), 23A-38-1 to -10 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-103 (1994), 29-9-101 to -108 (1980 &
Supp. 1994); TEx. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 21.002 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-7-18,
78-32-1 to -17 (1992 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 121-123 (1973 & Supp. 1994); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-456 to 459 (Michie 1988), 19.2-11, -318 to -319.-358 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.21.010-.900 (West 1992). 9.92.040 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE §§
61-5-26, 62-6-6 (1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 785.01-.06 (West 1981 & Supp 1992); WYO. STAT. §§
1-21-901 to -909 (1988), 5-5-135, 5-6-301 (1992).
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3691 - 3693 (1988).
33. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 46-48; Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion
Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 681 (1981). Professor Martineau was
the Reporter for the Wisconsin Judicial Council Committee on Contempt, which formulated
Wisconsin's contempt laws. Martineau at 677.
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ous acts.34 Over time, many different classification methods have been
used. 35 Today, however, only two of these classifications, civil-criminal
and direct-indirect, are widely used.36 Each of these is discussed below.
1. Civil-Criminal
The most common way to classify contempt is to distinguish civil
contempts from criminal contempts. 37 The distinction between these
types of contempt is important since criminal contempt proceedings
enjoy greater constitutional due process safeguards than do their civil
counterparts.38 A civil contempt occurs when the contemnor fails to do
34. See Martineau. supra note 33, at 681 (stating that the principal goal of classification schemes
was to enable the court to determine the appropriate procedure to apply); Tess-Mattner, supra note 22,
at 374 (recognizing that after classification of the contempt, the court can determine the appropriate
procedures to be used in sanctioning the contempt involved).
35. Martineau, supra note 33. at 681-83. In his article, Martineau examines several types of
classification schemes that have been or are currently being used. Id. These include: civil-criminal,
direct-indirect, positive-passive, punitive-remedial, aid to litigant-protection of the authority and
dignity of the court, mandatory-prohibitory, state-private, and willful-inadvertent. Id.
36. Id. at 681. See GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 47-48 (discussing classification of contempt).
37. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911). See also Fox, supra note
16. at I (noting that the civil and criminal classification is the most widely used).
38. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441. This was not always true. Before 1968, criminal contempt was
not considered a crime of such serious proportions that all of the constitutional safeguards should
apply. See, e.g., Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (finding contempt of court "itself"
did not warrant treatment as anything more than a petty offense). As a result, persons accused of
contempt were not given those constitutional protections which were otherwise available to more
serious criminal offenders. However, in 1968, the United States Supreme Court, in Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968), determined that serious contempts. those punishable by incarceration of
greater than six months, were crimes in the ordinary sense. Id. See also State v. Heath, 177 N.W.2d
751, 753 (N.D. 1970) (adopting the Bloom rationale and recognizing serious criminal contempt as a
crime). Consequently, following Bloom, a person accused of a serious criminal contempt is entitled to:
a public trial before an unbiased judge. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); notice of the charges laid
against him or her, time to prepare a defense, and the right to call witnesses, Cooke v. United States.
267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925); the presumption of innocence and having guilt proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, id.; and the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, Bloom, 391 U.S. at 210 (1968). Additionally, the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that "indigent defendants in civil contempt proceedings should be granted
counsel at state expense when, if they lose, they will likely be deprived of their physical liberty." State
v. Gruchalla, 467 N.W.2d 451, 453 (N.D. 1991). This seems to comport with the United States
Supreme Court's position that due process requires representation of counsel where there is a risk of
loss of liberty, regardless of the nomenclature used. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs. of Durham
County, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981).
Civil contempts do not enjoy the same constitutional protections due to the fact that the contemnor
in civil cases is in essence imposing the sanction upon him or herself by not doing what has been
ordered to be done. Shillitani v. United States. 384 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1966). See also Hodous v.
Hodous, 36 N.W.2d 554, 559 (N.D. 1949) (sanctioning defendant for failure to comply with court's
order to pay support); Gunsch v. Gunsch, 69 N.W.2d 739, 747 (N.D. 1954) (finding defendant guilty
of civil contempt for violating restraining order). Nevertheless, some due process safeguards, such as
the requirements of notice and a hearing, are extended to the civil contemnor. See Parsons v. Wennet,
625 So.2d 945. 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that before civil contempt sanctions may be
imposed, basic due process requires that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given to the
contemnor); Luttrell v. Panozzo, 625 N.E.2d 695, 698 (Il. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that in a civil
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something which the court has ordered that person to do for the benefit
of another, while a criminal contempt occurs when the contemnor does
something which a court has previously prohibited that person from
doing.39 Civil contempts are coercive and generally of a conditional
nature, leaving the "keys of the prison in [the contemnor's] own
pocket." 40 Consequently, a sanction imposed for a civil contempt will
continue in effect only for as long as the contemnor refuses to perform
the act which he or she has been ordered to perform by the court. 4
1
Once performance occurs, the contempt will be "purged," and the
sanction is removed. 42 The absence of the ability to purge the contempt
generally indicates that the sanction is not civil but criminal.43
Unlike their civil counterparts, criminal contempts are prosecuted to
vindicate the court's dignity and authority. 44  By punishing the
contemnor, the court seeks to deter the conduct of the person before the
court as well as send a message to the community that such actions will
not be tolerated. 45 Thus, criminal sanctions are generally both punitive
and unconditional in nature.46
2. Direct-Indirect
Either civil or criminal contempt may be further categorized as
direct or indirect, depending upon where the contemptuous conduct
occurs. 47  This classification is also very important to contempt
proceedings, for it determines whether the court may proceed summarily
against the contemnor, meaning that the contemnor will be prosecuted
without the opportunity of notice and a hearing. 48
Direct contempts occur when the contemnor's act is committed in
the immediate view or presence of the court or so near thereto as to
contempt proceeding, the contemnor is entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard).
39. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418, 449 (1911). See also RAPALjU supra note 30, at § 21, p. 25 (1884) (defining civil and
criminal contempts of court). -
40. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 458,461 (8th Cir. 1902). An example of this was present in Thorlakson v.
Wells, 207 N.W.2d 326, 327 (N.D. 1973). In Thorlakson, the trial court incarcerated Thorlakson for
15 days for failing to pay alimony or, alternatively, provide financial statements establishing his
inability to pay. Before doing so, the court issued its order and stated that Thorlakson could avoid
incarceration by simply preparing financial statements and conveying them to his former spouse's
attorney. Id. See also Gaschk v. Kohler, 294 N.W. 441, 442 (N.D. 1940) (incarcerating contemnor
until she complied with the support provision of the court's original order of divorce).
41. Id.
42. Parsons v. Wennet, 625 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
43. Id. In Parsons, the lower court's order of civil contempt was found to be in error because the
defendant could not purge himself from the contempt. Id.
44. Baer v. Hampton, 417 N.W.2d 801, 804 (N.D. 1987).
45. TiioMAs, supra note 14, at 9.
46. Id.
47. In re Littlefield, 851 P.2d 42, 53 (Ca. 1993).
48. Id.
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obstruct the administration of justice. 49 When a direct contempt occurs,
a court may proceed summarily.50 The use of summary proceedings has
long been recognized. 5' The North Dakota Supreme Court first
commented on the use of summary punishment in State v. Root,52
stating that
[w]here the contempt is committed while the court is sitting,
and in its immediate view and presence, no pleadings are
essential, and none are-required, in cases where the facts
constituting the contempt are within the personal cognizance of
the presiding judge. In such cases there are no pleadings
required, because there are no issues to be tried. All that is
requisite to a complete record in such cases is an order of the
court "stating the facts which constitute the offense, and
reciting that the same occurred in such immediate view and
presence, and plainly and specifically prescribing the
punishment to be inflicted therefor[e]." 53
Despite the fact that courts generally recognize the use of summary
proceedings, the use of such proceedings is limited to only those
situations where there is a compelling reason for an immediate remedy.54
In In re Oliver, 5 5 Justice Black set forth the circumstances under which a
narrow exception to the due process requirements exists, thereby
allowing the use of summary contempt proceedings. 56 He wrote that this
narrow exception includes:
only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of
the judge, which disturbs the court's business, where all of the
essential elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the
court, are actually observed by the court, and where immediate
49. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257. 275 (1948). Rule 42(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure sets forth that :
[a] criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he or she
saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the
actual presence of the court. The order of contempt must recite the facts and must be
signed by the judge and entered of record.
N.D. R. CRiM. P. 42 (a).
50. In re Uttlefield, 851 P.2d 42, 52 (Ca. 1993).
51. See In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1896) (allowing the contemnor to be punished for
contemptuous acts without a hearing, an opportunity to enter a plea. or charges.); State v. Goeller, 263
N.W.2d 135, 137 (N.D. 1978) (noting that the court's power to summarily exercise powers of contempt
has long been recognized).
52. 67 N.W. 590 (N.D. 1890).
53. State v. Root, 67 N.W. 590, 592 (N.D. 1896).
54. State v. Goeller, 263 N.W.2d at 137.
55. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
56. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275-76 (1948).
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punishment is essential to prevent "demoralization of the
court's authority" before the public. If some essential elements
of the offense are not personally observed by the judge, so that
he must depend on statements made by others for his
knowledge about these essential elements, due process requires
.. . that the accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing as
above set out.57
Thus, summary proceedings are only appropriate when the court
has observed the contemptuous act.58
If the contemptuous act was not a direct contempt, then the court
must find it was an indirect one, and the court may proceed against the
accused only after sufficient notice is given.59 Where the court is unclear
as to whether the contempt was direct or indirect, the court should
comply with the procedures for indirect contempt.60 This is true because
the summary procedures available for direct contempts are less
favored.6 1
3. Difficulties in Classifying Contempt
Attempts to classify contempt have "plagued the legal profession for
centuries." 62 This difficulty stems largely from the fact that traditionally,
contempt "embraced only what is now known as criminal contempt." 63
Historically, civil contempt began as "contempt in procedure," and was
considered only quasi-criminal in nature. 64 Thus, contempt was not
originally comprised of two distinct parts.65 Rather, contempt began as a
single body of contempt law, and a distinct procedural device, which,.
57. Id.
58. The use of summary proceedings may be further limited by the United States Supreme Court's
recognition of serious criminal contempt as a crime in the ordinary sense. See supra note 38
(discussing the constitutional safeguards which apply to criminal contempt proceedings). Because
constitutional safeguards must be applied in cases in which more than a six month punishment is
imposed, it seems likely that summary proceedings will not be available in such cases because they do
not offer all of the safeguards required by the Due Process Clause, such as notice and the right to call
witnesses.
59. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275-76 (1948). Rule 42(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that all contempts not subject to the summary proceedings of Rule 42(a) must be
prosecuted on notice. N. D. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
60. Baier v. Hampton, 417 N.W.2d 801, 806 (N.D. 1987).
61. Id.
62. State v. Stokes, 240 N.W.2d 867, 870 (N.D. 1976).
63. GOLDFARB, supra note 2, at 50. See Svihla v. Svihla, 126 N.W.2d 135, 139 (N.D. 1964); State
v. Babcock, 251 N.W. 849, 851 (N.D. 1933). See also Gloe, supra note 20, at 1121 (noting that the
law has not shed the confusion created by the sui generis nature of contempt).
64. GOLDFARa, supra note 2, at 50. Goldfarb writes that civil contempt, as it began, was primarily
a civil procedure device used to ensure compliance with judicial orders. Id. Thus, while it was
referred to as contempt, it was so in name and theory alone. Id.
65. Id. at 51.
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although like contempt and called contempt, was not really contempt. 66
This distinction, over time, has resulted in confusion and misapplication
of contempt law to the point that today, civil and criminal contempts are
considered mere shades of one another. 67 Consequently, the contemptu-
ous conduct involved in any case might easily be classified as either civil
or criminal. 68 As a result, trial court determinations as to whether a
contemptuous act is civil or criminal often end in reversal on appeal. 69
Classification problems may also arise from the fact that trial and
appellate courts look to different criteria when determining whether they
are dealing with civil or criminal contempt. 70 Statutes, for example,
often define contempt in terms of the acts which constitute such
conduct. 71 Consequently, for a trial court to determine that an accused
has acted contemptuously, it must do so in terms of the statutory
definitions. 72 Once that decision is made, the court then applies the
proper procedure for the type of contempt involved. However, if the
court's initial determination is erroneous, for example, the contempt was
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. State v. Stokes, 240 N.W.2d 867, 870 (N.D. 1976). In Stokes, the North Dakota Supreme
Court stated that "[mlany acts of contemptuous conduct and the sanction imposed contain elements of
both civil and criminal contempt.... What one court will call a civil contempt, another will call a
criminal contempt." Id. at 870. See THOMAS, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing classification problems).
Thomas states that the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt are "vague and uncertain, and
that violations of injunctions and other orders of court may constitute either a civil or a criminal
contempt or both." Id. Where confusion exists as to whether an act is civil or criminal, the controlling
principle is that "a punitive sanction can be imposed only after a contempt proceeding which meets
some of the basic requirements of criminal procedure." Martineau, supra note 33, at 684. Failure to
follow the correct procedure for the sanction imposed may result in reversal of the contempt
judgment. See, e.g., Baler v. Hampton, 417 N.W.2d 801. 806 (N.D. 1987) (reversing the criminal
contempt ruling because summary proceedings were applied where the court found the conduct to
have been indirect).
69. See Parsons v. Wennet, 625 So.2d 945. 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding the lower
court's order of civil contempt to be in error because the nature of the sanction was punitive and not
coercive because defendant could not purge himself from the contempt unless he admitted that he
perjured himself in court); Luttrell v. Panozzo, 625 N.E.2d 695, 698 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (reversing
lower court's finding of civil contempt because a $2,000 fine for violation of a restraining order was
based on past conduct and could not be purged); State v. Stokes, 240 N.W.2d 867. 870 (N.D. 1976)
(finding that lower court's judgment against the defendant for civil contempt was improper since the
court's purpose in sanctioning the defendant was punitive rather than coercive).
70. Memorandum from Gerhard Raedeke, Staff Attorney for the North Dakota Joint Procedure
Committee, to the members of the North Dakota Joint Procedures Committee § IV (Oct. 29-30, 1992)
(discussing the findings of the sub-committee appointed to analyze the current contempt procedures in
North Dakota regarding problems with North Dakota's contempt procedure) reprinted in Joint Proc.
Comm., Agenda 20, at 25-26 (Oct. 29-30. 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Agenda Memo].
71. See, e.,g., N.D. CErr. CODE §§ 27-10-03 (repealed 1993) (defining acts punishable as civil
contempt), 12.1-10-01(l) (repealed 1993) (defining acts punishable as criminal contempt).
72. Murphy v. Townley, 274 N.W. 857, 861 (N.D. 1937) (stating that courts may only punish
those acts that were statutorily defined to be contemptuous).
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truly criminal and not civil, the court's decision may be subject to
reversal for its failure to apply the appropriate procedure.
Appellate courts, on the other hand, are not bound to statutory
definitions of contempt; instead, they use a test developed by the United
States Supreme Court to distinguish civil from criminal contempts. 73
Under this test, the appellate court looks not to the contemnor's conduct,
but rather to the nature of the sanction imposed, to determine whether
the contempt was civil or criminal. 74 If the court determines that the trial
court's purpose was to coerce the contemnor to perform an act primarily
for the benefit of another, the contempt will be civil. 75 Conversely, if the
court finds that the trial court was seeking to punish the offender and
vindicate its authority, the contempt is criminal. 76 Thus, because each of
these courts uses different criteria to classify contempt, each contempt
order is subject to reversal on appeal. 77
III. CONTEMPT LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA
A. PRE-1993 CONTEMPT LAW
North Dakota's original contempt laws were adopted in 189578 and,
with some exceptions, 79 remained substantially unchanged until 1993.80
North Dakota's approach to contempt was typical of that taken by other
states in that it distinguished between civil and criminal contempt. 81 The
73. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). North Dakota adopted this test in
State v. Stokes, 240 N.W.2d 867, 870 (N.D. 1976). The Shillitani test was recently used by the North
Dakota Supreme Court in Baier v. Hampton, 417 N.W.2d 801. 804 (N.D. 1987).
74. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 369-70.
75. id. at 370.
76. Id. n. 5.
77. See, e.g., Vito v. Vito. 551 A.2d 573, 576 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (reversing the lower court's
finding that the contemnor was in civil contempt); Luttrell v. Panozzo, 625 N.E.2d 695, 698 (II1. App.
Ct. 1993) (reversing lower court's finding of civil contempt because $2,000 fine for violation of a
restraining order was based on past conduct and could not be purged).
78. North Dakota Revised Code §§ 5932 to 5954 (1895) [hereinafter N.D.R.C.].
79. The 1895 statutes were contained in one chapter of the N.D.R.C. and remained there until
1973. In 1973, section 12.1-10-01 of the North Dakota Century Code was created to separate civil
and criminal contempt into separate areas of the Century Code. See 1973 N.D. Laws, ch. 116, § 10
(creating § 12.1-10-01). However, after this section was enacted, many references to criminal
contempt in chapter 27-10 remained. Thus, further amendments were undertaken in 1975 and 1981 to
remove these references. See 1975 N.D. Laws, ch. 106, §§ 306 - 310 (removing the references to
criminal contempt from N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-10-06. -14 -16 to -17, -22); 1981 N.D. Laws, ch. 91, §
15 (eliminating references to criminal contempt from N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-12).
80. In 1993. the North Dakota Legislature enacted legislation that eliminated the distinctions
between civil and criminal contempt as well as consolidated the contempt laws back into one area of
the North Dakota Century Code. See infra section Ill(C) (discussing, in depth, the changes made in
1993).
81. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 750, 753 (McKinney 1992) (defining civil and criminal
contempts); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5a-1 1, -21 (1986) (defining civil and criminal contempts).
statutes pertaining to criminal contempts were contained in one
chapter, 82 while those dealing with civil contempts were contained in
another. 83 Each chapter defined contempt based on the contemnor's
conduct 8 4 and provided for the type of sanctions which could be
imposed for such conduct. 85 The Joint Procedure Committee deter-
mined that there were several problems with this system.
86
B. THE CALL FOR CHANGE
The effort to rewrite North Dakota's contempt law began in earnest
in 1978 when several members of the Joint Procedure Committee urged
that changes be made in the definitions of contempt. 87 This began more
than a decade of analysis of North Dakota's contempt law. 8 8 After close
examination, the Joint Procedure Committee determined that a new
system should be implemented to address what it believed were serious
flaws. 89 The problems recognized by the Committee were threefold. 90
These included 1) the need to classify contempt as either civil or
criminal, 2) the requirement of two hearings in indirect contempt cases,
and 3) the need to consolidate the contempt statutes into one area of the
North Dakota Century Code.91
82. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-10 (repealed 1993).
83. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-10 (amended 1993).
84. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-10-1(1) (repealed 1993) (defining criminal contempts),
27-10-03 (repealed 1993) (defining civil contempts).
85. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-10-1(2) & 27-10-04 (repealed 1993). Under section 12.1-10-1(2),
criminal contempt was a class B misdemeanor punishable by up to six months imprisonment and fines
in certain instances. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-10-1(2) (repealed 1993). Additionally, section 27-10-04
provided that persons found guilty of civil contempt could be fined as much as $250 over and above
the costs of the proceedings, imprisoned up to six months, or both. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-04
(repealed 1993).
86. See Memorandum from Jim Harris to Members of the Joint Procedure Committee (Dec. 23,
1983) (on file with author) (noting the problems the committee identified) [hereinafter Harris Memo];
see also Agenda Memo, supra note 70. Testimony of Gerhard Raedeke. Staff Attorney. Joint
Procedures Committee, on H.B. 1077, § IV. 6-7 (Jan. 11, 1993) (discussing problems with North
Dakota's contempt procedure) [hereinafter Raedeke Testimony].
87. Joint Proc. Comm. Minutes (Dec. 7-8, 1978) (on file with author) [hereinafter December
Minutes].
88. See Harris Memo, supra note 86, at 1 (referring to a prior request by the Joint Procedure
Committee for the committee's staff attorneys to research the contempt laws of other jurisdictions);
Joint Procedure Committee, Minutes, 9-10 (Nov. 7-8, 1991) (noting the creation of a subcommittee to
review and report on the different contempt schemes used by other states) (on file with author)
[hereinafter November Minutes].
89. Agenda Memo, supra note 70, at 19-31.
90. Id. at 25-26.
91. Id.
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1. The Need to Distinguish Civil and Criminal Contempt
Chief among the perceived problems was the requirement of
classifying contempts as either civil or criminal. 92 The classification of
contempt as civil or criminal is important because it determines the
procedural safeguards that the court must apply in sanctioning the
contemnor. 93 Nevertheless, for reasons both historic and statutory,
courts have had great difficulty in making these classifications. 94
Because of these difficulties, the Joint Procedure Committee
concluded that adoption of a system which did not require classification
of contempt as either civil or criminal would be advantageous. 9 5
Recognizing these problems, the Joint Procedure Committee determined
that new procedures should be adopted to more efficiently deal with
contempt. 96 After extensive analysis of the contempt systems used
throughout the United States, 97 the Committee decided that the basic
approach taken by Wisconsin in 198098 would be best suited to
implement the desired changes. 99 At the heart of Wisconsin's approach
is the abandonment of the distinction between civil and criminal
contempt.l00 Nevertheless, the basic concepts of civil and criminal
contempt are retained by providing for remedial and punitive sanc-
tions. 10 1 Thus, by adopting Wisconsin's approach, the Committee
believed it could meet its goal of eliminating the need to distinguish civil
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 33-61 and the accompanying text (discussing the reasons for classification of
contempt).
94. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text (discussing the problems resulting from
attempts to classify contempts).
95. Agenda Memo, supra note 17, at 25-26.
96. Id.
97. See Harris Memo, supra note 86, at 3-15 (examining alternative systems available to replace
North Dakota's contempt laws); November Minutes, supra note 88. In his memorandum, Jim Harris.
the Joint Procedure Committee's staff attorney, looked to the contempt schemes used in Wisconsin.
North Carolina, Washington, Alaska, Colorado, Maryland, and Michigan. Harris Memo, supra note
86, at 3-15.
98. WIs. STAT. ANN. ch. 785 (1981 & West Supp. 1993).
99. See Joint Procedure Committee, Minutes 17 (Oct. 29-30, 1992) (approving the proposed
legislation unanimously) (on file with author) [hereinafter October Minutes].
100. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 785.01, comment (West 1981) (providing only a broad definition of
"contempt of court"); Martineau. supra note 33, at 687 (noting that the Wisconsin approach requires
the abandonment of the civil and criminal distinctions); Tess-Mattner. supra note 22, at 394 (discussing
the elimination of the need to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt under the Wisconsin
approach). Wisconsin adopted this approach following its suggestion by Professor Dobbs nearly a
decade earlier. Martineau, supra note 33, at 687.
101. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 785.01, comment (West 1981) (noting that the definitions of punitive
and remedial sanctions are meant to continue the concepts of civil and criminal contempt but not
define them as such); see also Tess-Mattner, supra note 22, at 394 (noting that the criminal and civil
contempt distinctions are retained in the definitions of remedial and punitive sanctions).
1994]
and criminal contempts. The subsequent legislation introduced by the
legislature, at the request of the North Dakota Supreme Court, carried
just such a plan.102
2. The Requirement of Two Hearings in Indirect
Contempt Cases
The Committee also found that a problem existed in indirect
contempt cases where the accused was brought before the court on a
warrant of attachment or an order to show cause and refused to admit to
the contemptuous wrongdoing with which he or she was charged.103 The
procedure set forth for indirect contempt was contained in section
27-10-07 of the North Dakota Century Code. 104 This section provided
that an affidavit had to be filed with the court setting forth the facts
surrounding the alleged contemptuous act when an act punishable as an
indirect contempt occurred. 105 If the affidavit satisfied the court that
such an act had occurred, 106 the court was then required to either make
an order requiring the accused to show cause at a designated place and
time1 07 or issue a warrant of attachment ordering the county sheriff to
bring the accused before it at a designated place and time. 108
Once the accused was before the court, section 27-10-13 governed
the procedure.109 Under that section, the accused was given the
opportunity to admit to the conduct and face punishment.110 However,
if the accused refused to admit guilt, the court was required to file a
complaint in the form of an affidavit specifying the facts and circum-
102. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.1 (Supp. 1993) (enacting a contempt of court scheme
closely resembling Wisconsin's).
103. Agenda Memo, supra note 70, at 26.
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-07 (amended 1993).
105. Id. The party filing the affidavit was generally the aggrieved party or a representative.
See, e.g., Hodous v. Hodous, 36 N.W.2d 554, 557-58 (N.D. 1949) (establishing that an order to show
cause why Mr. Hodous should not be held in contempt of court was only issued following application
of plaintiff for such order).
106. Generally, before an order to show cause or warrant of attachment issued, the person filing
the affidavit had to establish; by clear and convincing evidence, that the accused committed the
contemptuous act. See, e.g., Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 391 N.W.2d 627, 633 (N.D.
1986); Buchmann v. Buchmann, 202 N.W.2d 677, 680 (N.D. 1972); Svihla v. Svihla. 126 N.W.2d 135,
141 (N.D. 1964).
107. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-07(1) (amended 1993).
108. Id. § 27-10-07(2) (amended 1993).
109. N.D. CETr. CODE § 27-10-13 (amended 1993).
110. Id.
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stances of the offense charged. I I1 After doing so, the accused had to be
given a reasonable period of time to answer the charges. 12
The Committee concluded that the requirement of two hearings
under the old contempt statutes was a burden to the judiciary since, in all
likelihood, only one hearing was necessary."1 3 Thus, the proposed
legislation consolidated the two hearings into one, making the system
more efficient. 114
3. Consolidation
Finally, the Committee found that the consolidation of all of the
contempt laws into one chapter of the North Dakota Century Code
would make it simpler and less confusing for the practitioner.' 5
Confusion resulted in large part from the legislature's failure to fully
separate the chapters on civil and criminal contempt. 116 Thus, the
Committee believed that placing substantially all of the procedure
required for contempt into one area of the Century Code could make the
contempt laws more user-friendly.117 Where it was necessary to maintain
contempt law outside of that chapter, those areas would refer the
practitioner back to the contempt chapter for the appropriate procedure
to be applied."i 8 Thus, consolidation of the contempt laws would
eliminate some of the confusion which existed, making the law clearer
for the user.119 Consequently; the Committee's proposed legislation
included several provisions for achieving such consolidation. 120
C. NORTH DAKOTA CONTEMPT LAW- 1993
The new contempt law enacted by the North Dakota Legislature
during its 1993 Session consists mainly of four new sections added to
111. Id. In general, the affidavit used to file a complaint was the same affidavit used to obtain
the order to show cause or warrant. Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 7.
112. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-13 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
113. Agenda Memo, supra note 70, at 26.
114. See H.B. 1077 §§ 14, 19 (1993) (amending sections 27-10-07 and 27-10-13, respectively).
115. Agenda Memo, supra note 70, at 26.
116. Id. In a memorandum from Gerhard Raedeke to the Joint Procedure Committee. Mr.
Raedeke noted that section 27-10-04 of the North Dakota Century Code created some confusion
because it appeared to "authorize criminal penalties for civil contempt." Id. See also Baier v.
Hampton, 417 N.W.2d 801, 805 (N.D. 1987) (noting that the authorization of an "unconditional jail
sentence for civil contempt overlooks the coercive-punitive distinction between civil and criminal
contempt[]').
117. Agenda Memo. supra note 70, at 26.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See H.B. 1077 § 32 (1993) (repealing the criminai contempt provisions contained at section
12.1-10-01 of the North Dakota Century Code).
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chapter 27-10 of the North Dakota Century Code121 In addition, several
sections of the former statutes were amended and retained in the new
system.122 Finally, several sections were repealed as being either
redundant or inconsistent with the new system.123
1. The New Sections
As previously mentioned, four new sections were added to chapter
27-10 of the North Dakota Century Code. The first of these is
definitions. 124 The first term defined is "contempt of court." 125 Unlike
previous law, "contempt of court" is no longer defined as civil or
criminal; instead, it is defined in terms of six separate types of contemp-
tuous conduct, 126 each defined in "broad and general terms" so as to not
exclude conduct previously defined as contemptuous by North Dakota
121. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-10-01.1 to -01.4 (Supp. 1993). See also 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 89, §
10-13 (setting forth the legislation enacted in its entirety).
122. N.D. CEtr. CODE §§ 27-10-07 to -11, 27-10 -13, 27-10-18 to -20, 27-10-23 (Supp. 1993)
(amended 1993).
123. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-10-01, 27-10-03 to -06, 27-10-12, 27-10-14 to -17, 27-10-21 to
-22, 27-10-24 to -27 (Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993). These changes were made largely to consolidate
the contempt laws into one chapter of the North Dakota Century Code, achieving the consolidation
sought by the committee. Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 7. See also supra notes 115-20 and
accompanying text (discussing the need to consolidate North Dakota's contempt laws).
124. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.1 (Supp. 1993).
125. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.1 (Supp. 1993) (defining actions only in terms of
"contempt of court") with N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-10-1(1) (1985) (repealed 1993) (defining actions
constituting criminal contempt) and 27-10-03 (1991) (repealed 1993) (defining actions constituting
civil contempt). Section 27-10-01.1 provides:
27-10-01.1. Definitions. As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. "Contempt of Court" means:
a. Intentional misconduct in the presence of the court which interferes with the
court proceeding or with the administration of justice, or which impairs the respect due
the court:
b. Intentional nonpayment of a sum of money ordered by the court to be paid
in a case where by law execution cannot be awarded for the collection of the sum;
c. Intentional disobedience, resistance, or obstruction of the authority, process,
or order of a court or other officer including a referee or magistrate;
d. Intentional refusal of a witness to appear for examination, to be sworn or to
affirm, or to testify after being ordered to do so by the court:
e. Intentional refusal to produce a record, document, or other object after
being ordered todo so by the court; or
f. Any other act or omission specified in the court rules or by the law as a
ground for contempt of court.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.1 (1) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
In its first statement on the new contempt law, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in a footnote,
recognized that the new statute "eliminates the denomination of specific conduct as either 'criminal' or
'civil' contempt of court" in favor of a generic reference to "contempt of court." State v. Mertz, 514
N.W.2d 662, 666 n.3 (N.D. 1994).
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.1 (Supp. 1993).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
law. 127 That definition generally requires that the contemnor's conduct
be intentional, 128 indicating that the ability of the contemnor to refrain
from the contempt is essential. 129 At first glance, this seems to indicate a
shift in North Dakota's contempt law, which prevously required that the
contemnor's actions be willfully done in order for a contempt finding.130
However, one commentator has stated that "[t]o the extent that 'willful'
required anything beyond 'intentional' it was unnecessary; to the extent
it did not require anything more it was redundant." 131 Thus, the new
contempt law's shift from willful to intentional may be of little signifi-
cance. Nevertheless, by requiring intentional conduct on the part of the
contemnor, it appears that the legislature intended that the defenses for
mistaken or inadvertently committed acts would remain vital under the
new law. 132
To be in contempt of court, a person must be before a "court,"
which is defined as "a court of record of this state." 133 Thus, under this
statute, only North Dakota's supreme court, temporary court of appeals,
district courts, county courts, and courts created by law for cities are
"courts" for contempt purposes. 134 The committee rejected proposals to
expand the definition of "court" to include municipal courts, juvenile
courts, and referees. 135 The committee found that because juvenile and
municipal courts were empowered with the contempt power elsewhere in
127. See Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 8-9 (stating that the definitions of contempt are to
be broad and general so as not to exclude those acts defined as contemptuous in previous North
Dakota law). The Joint Procedure Committee's goal was to re-write the statutes but not the case law.
Id. See also Martineau, supra note 33, at 689 (noting that under the Wisconsin statutes, the definitions
of acts constituting contempt are stated in general terms to be inclusive); Tess-Mattner, supra note 22.
at 394 (stating that by using broad terms the Wisconsin legislature intended to be inclusive).
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.1 (Supp. 1993).
129. See Martineau, supra note 33. at 689 (discussing the historical classification of contempt).
130. For civil cases, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-03 (1) & (4) (repealed 1993). Case law also
establishes that in civil contempt cases the contemnor must have acted willfully. See, e.g., Raszler v.
Raszler, 80 N.W.2d 535, 539 (N.D. 1956); Gunsch v. Gunsch, 69 N.W.2d 739, 746 (N.D. 1954)
(stating that the accused must act willfully for the court to find a contempt).
No intent requirement was included for criminal contempts, but case law establishes that
.willful" was equally applicable there. See, e.g., State v. Heath, 177 N.W.2d 751, 756 (N.D. 1970)
(finding the defendant's willful violation of the court's order contemptuous).
131. Martineau, supra note 33, at 690.
132. See Raszler v. Raszler, 80 N.W.2d 535 (N.D. 1956) (finding that an action based on mistake
is not a contemptuous act). In Raszler, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the defendant's
conduct was not contemptuous since he was mistaken as to the amount of money he owed his former
spouse under their divorce decree. Id. at 539. Thus, because he did not act with deliberate intent, he
could not be found in contempt Id.
133. N.D. CENTr. CODE § 27-10-01.1(2) (Supp. 1993).
134. N.D. CErT. CODE § 27-01-01.1 Note (Supp. 1993) (current version effective through Jan. 2,
1995) (Jan. 1, 1996 version codified at N.D. CENr. CODE § 27-01-01 (Supp. 1993)) (eliminating county
courts and temporary courts of appeal).
135. October Minutes, supra note 99, at 2-3 (Oct. 29-30, 1992).
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the Century Code, additional reference to them was unnecessary.1 36
Further reference to referees was found to be equally unnecessary
because they were specifically granted the contempt power elsewhere in
the new contempt statutes. 137
Where a contempt of court is found to have occurred, the court may
impose either a punitive or remedial sanction. 138 "Punitive and remedial
sanctions" 139 are defined by incorporating the traditional characteristics
of civil and criminal contempt.140 Traditionally, punitive sanctions were
those imposed in criminal contempt cases while remedial sanctions were
imposed in civil cases. 141 It has been stated that the inclusion of these
definitions in the contempt statute is "essential to the elimination of
confusion concerning civil and criminal contempt by the operational
approach."142 This is true because, under the statute, contempts are only
distinguished by the type of sanction involved. Consequently, this places
the trial court on the same page as the appellate court in determining
what type of contempt has occurred.
The next section added establishes the court's power to punish
contempts.143 Here, the statute provides that "[a] court of record of this
136. Id. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has determined that juvenile courts must follow the
contempt procedures set forth in chapter 785 of the Wisconsin Statutes Annotated when exercising
contempt powers. In re B.S.. 469 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
137. October Minutes. supra note 99, at 4. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.2(2) (Supp. 1993)
(providing that a contemptuous act before a referee is deemed a contempt of the court appointing the
referee and may be acted upon by it). See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing
referee contempt power).
138. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.2 (1) (Supp. 1993) (allowing a court of record to impose
punitive or remedial sanctions where a contempt of court is found).
139. Sections 27-10-01.1(3) and (4) of the North Dakota Century Code contain the definitions of
punitive and remedial sanctions and provide as follows:
3. "Punitive sanction" includes a sanction of imprisonment if the sentence is for a definite
period of time. A sanction requiring payment of a sum of money is punitive if the
sanction is not conditioned upon performance or nonperformance of an act, and if the
sanction's purpose is to uphold the authority of the court.
4. "Remedial sanction" includes a sanction that is conditioned upon performance or
nonperformance of an act required by court order. A sanction requiring payment of a
sum of money is remedial if the sanction is imposed to compensate a party or
complainant, other than the court, for loss or injury suffered as a result of the contempt.
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-10-01.1 (3) & (4) (Supp. 1993).
140. Compare N.D. CEr. CODE §§ 27-10-01.1 (3) & (4) (Supp. 1993) (defining remedial and
punitive contempts under North Dakota law) with supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text
(discussing generally the traditional characteristics of civil and criminal contempt).
141. See Parsons v. Wennet. 625 So.2d 945, 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding lower court's
order of civil contempt to be in error because the nature of the sanction was punitive and not coercive
because the defendant could not purge himself from the contempt unless he admitted that he perjured
himself in court); State v. Stokes, 240 N.W.2d 867, 870 (N.D. 1976) (finding that lower court's
judgment against the defendant for civil contempt was improper because the court's purpose in
sanctioning the defendant was punitive rather than coercive).
142. Martineau, supra note 33. at 693.
143. N.D. CNr. CODE § 27-10-01.2 (Supp. 1993).
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state may impose a remedial or punitive sanction for contempt of court
under this chapter."144 This language should not be construed as a
legislative grant of the contempt power to the courts but as a recognition
of their inherent power to punish contempt.145 Nevertheless, this section
does demonstrate the legislature's ability to regulate the court's use of the
contempt power. 146
This section is also important because it extends the contempt power
to referees by deeming the contemptuous acts occurring before a referee
as contempts of the court which appointed the referee. 147 However, in
order to exercise such power, the statute requires the referee to report the
contemptuous occurrence to the court for proper proceedings, making
it seem likely that, in such instances, the court will only be allowed to
proceed using indirect contempt procedures because the contemptuous
act did not appear in the actual presence of the court.
148
The most important change, and the heart of the new contempt
law,1 49 is contained in the third new section, which sets forth the
procedure to be followed by the court in contempt cases. 150 Under this
144. Id. § 27-10-01.2(1).
145. Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 10.
146. Id. Most courts have accepted the fact that legislatures may impose limitations on the
exercise of contempt power so long as they do not render the power ineffectual. See Anderson v.
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227-228, 5 L.Ed. 242, 248 (1821); Exparte Hill, 158 So. 531 (Ala. 1935); State v.
King, 262 N.W.2d 80 (Wis. 1978).
147. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.2(2) (Supp. 1993).
148. Id.
149. See Martineau, supra note 33, at 695 (noting that section 785.03 of the Wisconsin statutes is
the heart of the contempt chapter).
150. Section 27-10-01.3 provides that:
1. a. The court on its own motion or motion of a person aggrieved by contempt of court
may seek imposition of a remedial sanction for the contempt by filing a motion for that purpose
in the proceeding to which the contempt is related. The court, after notice and hearing, may
impose a remedial sanction authorized by this chapter.
b. The state's attorney of a county, the attorney general, or a special prosecutor
appointed by the court may seek the imposition of a punitive sanction by issuing a complaint
charging a person with contempt of court and reciting the sanction sought to be imposed. The
state's attorney, attorney general, or special prosecutor may initiate issuance of the complaint or
may issue the complaint on the request of a party to an action or proceeding in a court or of the
judge presiding in an action or proceeding. A judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial of
an alleged contemnor if a reasonable likelihood or appearance of bias or prejudice will
otherwise exist, if the contempt alleged involves disrespect or criticism of the judge, or if the
judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts. The person charged is entitled to
trial by jury.
c. The court may hold a hearing on a motion for a remedial sanction jointly with a
trial on a complaint seeking a punitive sanction.
2. The judge presiding in an action or proceeding may impose a punitive sanction upon a
person who commits contempt of court in the actual presence of the court. The judge shall
impose the punitive sanction immediately after the contempt of court and only for the purpose
of preserving order in the court and protecting the authority and dignity of the court.
3. An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from any order or judgment finding a
person guilty of contempt. An order or judgment finding a person guilty of contempt is a final
order or judgment for purposes of appeal.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.3 (Supp. 1993).
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section, once a court has determined that a contemptuous act has
occurred, the court must immediately determine the type of sanction it
seeks to impose upon the actor. 151 This decision will establish "the
procedure to be used in the [following] contempt proceeding."1 52 By
requiring the court to determine the type of procedure it will follow at
the outset, the statute seeks to minimize the risk that the court will apply
the wrong procedures, resulting in a later reversal on due process
grounds. 153 The type of procedure to be used depends upon where the
contemptuous act occurs.
When a contemptuous act occurs in the actual presence of the court,
the court may use summary procedures to impose a punitive sanction. 154
However, these sanctions must be imposed immediately after the
contempt has occurred and only for the purpose of preserving the
court's order and protecting its dignity and authority. 155 Where the
sanction is not imposed until after the judicial proceeding has ended, the
summary procedure will not be applicable. 156 While previous North
Dakota law allowed the use of summary procedures for both civil 157 and
criminal contempts,158 the new statute changes that by specifically
limiting the use of summary procedures to cases involving punitive
sanctions. 159 Consequently, under the new law, only those contempts
151. See Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 10 (stating that the court must determine the
sanctions sought at the outset of contempt proceedings under the Wisconsin scheme); Tess-Matner,
supra note 22, at 395 (discussing the significance of the addition of the requirement of determining the
sanction sought at the outset)
152. Martineau, supra note 33, at 695.
153. See, e.g., Vito v. Vito, 557 A.2d 573, 578 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (reversing the lower court's
finding of contempt because the contemnor was not given appropriate due process); Luttrell v.
Panozzo. 625 N.E.2d 695, 698 (I1. App. Ct. 1993) (reversing lower court's finding of civil contempt
because contemnor did not get procedural protections necessary for criminal contempt).
154. N.D. CEcr. CODE § 27-10-01.3(2). This section provides as follows:
2. The judge presiding in an action or proceeding may impose a punitive sanction upon a
person who commits contempt of court in the actual presence of the court. The judge
shall impose the punitive sanction immediately after the contempt of court and only for
the purpose of preserving order in the court and protecting the authority and dignity of
the court.
Id.
155. Id. See also Martineau, supra note 33, at 700 (noting that Wisconsin's version of this
contempt scheme requires that the sanction be immediately imposed and used only to preserve the
court's order and protect its dignity and authority).
156. Martineau, supra note 33, at 700-01. The Wisconsin courts have had some difficulty in
dealing with the use of summary procedure. See infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text
(discussing Wisconsin's problems using summary procedure). Much of this difficulty seems to center
around the question of when an act occurs in the "actual presence" of the court. Id.
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-06 (repealed 1993).
158. N.D. R. CIuM. P. 42(a).
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.3(2) (Supp. 1993).
1994] 1047
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
which are criminal in nature, thus punishable with punitive sanctions,
may be proceeded against summarily.
Under previous law, summary proceedings were only available in
those cases where the contemptuous act occurred in the "actual presence"
of the court. 160 The new contempt statute largely continues this "actual
presence" requirement, with the exception that the judge is no longer
required to certify that he or she saw the contemptuous conduct and that
it was committed in the judge's actual presence.161 Nevertheless, the
court's record must reveal the basis for its contempt finding and
imposing sanctions.
Unlike summary procedures, nonsummary procedures are available
in cases involving either remedial or punitive sanctions. 162 Nonsummary
procedures for remedial sanctions may only be sought on "motion of a
person aggrieved by the contempt of court . . . .," except where the
court does so on its own motion. 163 When a motion is filed, the
procedure applied to the motion is the same as that governing the
underlying matter. 164 Thus, if the main action is civil, the rules of civil
procedure will apply. 165 On the other hand, if the main action is
criminal, the rules of criminal procedure will be applied to the motion. 166
When using nonsummary procedures where punitive sanctions are
sought, the procedure applied is identical to that applicable to ordinary
criminal matters. 167 Thus, the person complaining of the contempt,
whether it be an individual or the presiding judge, must initiate the
proceedings by presenting the alleged facts to a person who is allowed
under the statute to file a complaint.168 However, when it is appropriate
to do so, the attorney general, state's attorney, or a special prosecutor
may file the complaint on his or her own. 169 If the complaint is
ultimately filed, all of the procedural safeguards applied to criminal
defendants are made fully applicable to the contemnor who is subject to
160. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) (setting forth that criminal contempts could be punished
summarily where the contemptuous act occurred in the actual presence of the court).
161. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.3(2) (Supp. 1993) with N.D. R. CRIM. P. 42(a).
162. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.3(1) (Supp. 1993).
163. Id. § 27-10-01.3(1)(a).
164. See id. (providing that the motion is filed in the proceeding to which the contempt is related);
see also Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 11 (discussing the procedure applied to a motion
seeking remedial sanctions); and Martineau, supra note 33, at 696 (noting that the procedure followed
in filing a motion for remedial contempt is that applied in the proceeding in which the contempt arose).
165. Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 11.
166. Id.
167. Martineau, supra note 33, at 697.
168. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.3(l)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1993).
169. Id. § 27-10-01.3(l)(a).
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punitive sanctions.1 70 Thus, under the new statute, all of the due process
safeguards applicable to persons charged with crimes in the ordinary
sense will extend to a person charged with a nonsummary contempt in
which punitive sanctions are sought.171 As a result, North Dakota law
may afford the contemnor greater protections than those required by the
United States Supreme Court. 172
An additional safeguard is provided whereby the presiding judge
may be disqualified from presiding at the trial if the alleged contempt
occurred before the judge, the contempt charged resulted from the
contemnor's criticism of the judge, there is a reasonable likelihood or
appearance of bias or prejudice, and the judge has personal knowledge
of disputed facts in the case. 173 This provision is claimed to have
eliminated the risk of judicial bias and the potential for abuse of the
contempt power. 174
Where the situation arises, a court may hear joint motions for
punitive and remedial sanctions. 175 This, it is claimed, will promote
efficiency in the judicial system by avoiding duplication of proceed-
ings.176 Nevertheless, when a court undertakes the motions jointly, it
must apply the proper procedures to each motion and be wary of the
risk of confusing them. 177
The final section added contains the sanctions which may be
imposed for contempt. 178 The remedial sanctions include money
damages,179 imprisonment, 8 0 and forfeitures. 181 A forfeiture is unlike a
fine, which is punitive in nature, because it is conditional and only
accrues so long as the contempt continues. 182 Moreover, unlike money
damages, a forfeiture is paid to the court rather than to an aggrieved
170. Martineau, supra note 33, at 697.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 38 (discussing the due process safeguards applicable in contempt
proceedings).
173. N.D. CEr. CODE § 27-10-01.3(1)(b) (Supp. 1993).
174. Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 12. See Martineau. supra note 33, at 698-99 (stating
that the ability to remove the presiding judge eliminates the risk of judicial bias and abuse of the
contempt power).
175. N.D. CET. CODE § 27-10-01.3(l)(c) (Supp. 1993).
176. Tess-Mattner, supra note 22, at 396.
177. See id. (stating that, because of the risk of confusion, the procedure for hearing joint
motions will likely be rarely used).
178. N.D. CENTr. CODE § 27-10-01.4 (Supp. 1993).
179. Id. § 27-10-01.4(1)(a).
180. Id. § 27-10-01.4(i)(b).
181. Id. § 27-10-01.4(1)(c).
182. Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 13. See also Martineau. supra note 33, at 703
(discussing forfeitures).
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party.183 Finally, the court is allowed to issue orders designed to ensure
compliance,' 84 as well as any sanction, other than those listed above, if it
determines the other sanctions to be ineffective.185
The statute also provides for punitive sanctions. 186 These sanctions
include both fines and imprisonment.1 87 The severity of the sanction
imposed is largely determined by the type of procedure applied by the
court. 188 For instance, if the contempt was summarily proceeded against,
lighter sanctions must be applied because not all of the required
procedural safeguards were afforded the accused. 189 Conversely, the
accused may be given harsher sanctions in nonsummary cases because
the procedural safeguards were applied.190
2. The Amended and Repealed Sections
As discussed above, the Joint Procedure Committee believed that
consolidation of the contempt laws and elimination of the requirement
of two hearings were essential to lessen some of the confusion surround-
ing the old contempt laws. 191 To address these concerns, the legislature
amended several sections of the Century Code 192 and repealed several
others.193 The desired consolidation of the contempt laws was accom-
plished by eliminating chapter 12.1-10 of the Century Code, the
provisions relating to criminal contempt.194 Thus, substantially all of
North Dakota's contempt law is now found in chapter 27-10.195 Where it
was necessary that laws relating to contempt be maintained outside of
183. Martineau. supra note 33, at 703.
184. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.4 (I)(d) (Supp. 1993).
185. Id. § 27-10-01.4(1)(e). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has interpreted a similar section,
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 785.04 (West 1981), to allow a trial court to award "attorney's fees and other
litigation costs." Town of Seymour v. City of Eau Claire, 332 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
North Dakota's version of the contempt statute specifically states that "an amount to reimburse the
party for costs and expenses incurred as a result of the contempt" may be awarded by the court. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.4(1)(a) (Supp. 1993).
186. N.D. CENr. CODE § 27-10-01.4 (2) (Supp. 1993).
187. Id.
188. Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 14.
189. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.4 (2)(b) (Supp. 1993).
190. Id. § 27-10-01.4 (2)(a).
191. See supra section Ill(B) (discussing the problems found to exist under previous North
Dakota law).
192. 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 89 (amending N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-15-35, 14-05-25.1, 14-06-03.1.
14-07.1-06, 14-08.1-05, 14-12.1-09, 14-17-09, 14-17-16, 27-09.1-07, 27-10-07 to -1, 27-10-13,
27-10-18 to -20, 27-10-23, 27-19-07, 27-20-55, 28-21-12.1, 29-10.1-39. 42-02-10 to -11, 51-15-06.1.
54-35-02(7) and eliminating references to civil and criminal contempt).
193. See 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 89, § 32 (repealing N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 12.1-10-01, 27-10-03 to
-06. 27-10-12, 27-10-14 to -17, 27-10-21 to -22, 27-10-24 to -27) (repealed 1993).
194. See id. (repealing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-10-01).
195. N.D. CENT. CODE ch 27-10 (Supp. 1993).
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chapter 27-10, however, those sections were simply amended, referring
the user to chapter 27-10 for the correct procedure to be applied.196
Thus, the new contempt provisions are largely contained in one chapter
of the Century Code, as the Committee found was necessary to eliminate
confusion.
To address the problem of two hearings in cases involving
contemnors presented by warrant of attachment or by an order to show
cause, the legislature substantially amended those sections which created
the need for two hearings. 197 As amended, all references to the second
hearing procedure have been eliminated. 198 Instead, the new law
provides that when a contemnor is brought before a court under such
circumstances the court must proceed pursuant to section 27-10-01.3
(1).199 Thus, the new law consolidates the two hearings previously
required into one.
IV. WILL IT WORK? THAT IS THE QUESTION
Because North Dakota's new contempt law is patterned on
Wisconsin's 1980 approach, 200 an examination of Wisconsin's experienc-
es since that time may be helpful in determining how successful North
Dakota's law will be in eliminating some of the confusion which resulted
from the need to classify contempts. 201 Since Wisconsin adopted its
current approach in 1980, several challenges of contempt rulings have
been made.202 Of these cases, a general theme seems to appear, revealing
three problem areas under the new statute.203 These include: ambiguity
resulting from the statute's usage of broad and general terms; 204
difficulty in determining when summary proceedings are available to a
196. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-55 (Supp. 1993) (providing that a court may punish contempt
under chapter 27-10); 42-02-11 (Supp. 1993) (directing that contempt proceedings are to be
conducted as provided in chapter 27-10).
197. The following sections underwent substantial amendment: N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-10-07 to
-08, 27-10-13 (Supp. 1993).
198. Compare N.D.CENT CODE § 27-10-13 (1991) (amended 1993) with N.D. CENT CODE §
27-10-13 (Supp. 1993).
199. N.D. CENT CODE § 27-10-13 (Supp. 1993).
200. Raedeke Testimony, supra note 86, at 1.
201. See supra notes, 87-102 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties that the
committee perceived as a result of the need to classify contempts as civil or criminal.
202. See infra notes 210-32 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving Wisconsin's
current contempt laws.
203. See id.
204. See infra notes 210-217 and accompanying text (discussing challenges to chapter 785 of the
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated based on ambiguity).
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court;20 5 and difficulty in classifying punitive and remedial sanctions. 206
Each of these is discussed below in greater detail.
Because the new contempt law seeks only to change the procedural
aspect of the contempt law and not the substantive aspect, the new law is
written in a broad and general manner to maintain the vitality of the
previously established substantive law. 207 Some Wisconsin courts have
discovered, however, that this may result in claims that the statute is
ambiguous and of overbroad. 208 For example, in Town of Seymour v.
City of Eau Claire,20 9 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that a
provision relating to imposable sanctions was ambiguous because it
could be interpreted as both allowing and disallowing a court to award
attorney's fees and costs as damages. 210 Despite this finding, the court
ultimately determined that an award of attorney's fees and litigation costs
was appropriate. 211 A further example of statutory ambiguity is found
in Currie v. Schwalbach.212 In Currie, the contemnor appealed the lower
court's decision to use summary proceedings, claiming it was improper
205. See infra notes 219-225 and accompanying text (discussing judicial difficulties in
determining when acts are conducted in the "actual presence" of the court).
206. See infra notes 226-32 and accompanying text (discussing judicial challenges of chapter 785
of the Wisconsin Statutes Annotated).
207. Interview with Judge Lawrence Leclerc, member of the Joint Procedure Committee, in
Fargo, N.D. (July 18, 1993). In this interview, Judge Leclerc stated that the Committee's intent in
formulating the legislation was to maintain North Dakota law as it related to substantive contempt law.
Id.
208. See, e.g., Currie v. Schwalbach, 390 N.W.2d 575, 579-580 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), affd. 407
N.W.2d 862 (Wis. 1987) (finding the provisions contained in section 785.03(2) of Wisconsin's statutes
to be ambiguous); Town of Seymour v. City of Eau Claire. 332 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)
(deciding that section 785.04(1)(a) relating to imposable sanctions was ambiguous).
209. 332 N.W.2d 821 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
210. Town of Seymour v. City of Eau Claire, 332 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). In
Town of Seymour. Seymour sued the city of Eau Claire seeking to stop or restrict it from developing a
landfill site in Seymour. Id. at 822. However, the action was settled when the parties stipulated that
the city would construct only a transfer station, which would be operational in late 1979. Id.
Thereafter, in 1980, the city reneged on its agreement to build the landfill station. Id. at 823.
Consequently, the town sought a contempt ruling which was granted. Id. As part of its contempt
order, the district court awarded Seymour costs, attorney's fees and disbursements. Id. From that
decision, Eau Claire appealed.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, concluding that although section
785.04(1)(a) (comparable to N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.4(1)(a)) was subject to more than one
interpretation, and thus ambiguous. the section authorized "the trial court to award attorney's fees and
other litigation costs." Id. at 824.
211. Id.
212. 390 N.W.2d 575,579-580 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), affd, 407 N.W.2d 862 (Wis. 1987).
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because his contempt was not an ongoing one.213 In deciding the issue,
the court agreed with the contemnor that the statute involved
was ambiguous. 2 14 Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded that the
district court properly used summary procedures. 215 By reading these
cases together, it becomes apparent that the language used in Wisconsin's
contempt provision is subject to differing interpretations which may
result in overbreadth claims. Consequently, the statute's provisions may
be subjected to heightened scrutiny because of the differing interpreta-
tions available.
The second area in which Wisconsin's courts have experienced
difficulty is in the use of summary procedures. 216 In Currie, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court dealt generally with the issue of when the use
of summary procedures was permitted under the statute. 217 The court
concluded that summary procedures were only available if all of the
following factors were met:
(1) The contumacious act must have been committed in the
actual presence of the court; (2) the sanction must be imposed
for the purpose of preserving order in the court; (3) the
sanction must be imposed for the purpose of protecting the
authority and dignity of the court; and (4) the sanction must
be imposed immediately after the contempt. 218
213. Currie v. Schwalbach, 390 N.W.2d 575. 579 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986). affd, 407 N.W.2d 862
(Wis. 1987). Currie claimed that section 785.03(2) (comparable to N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.3(2))
required that the contempt be of an ongoing nature before summary contempt could be used. Currie,
390 N.W.2d at 579. Currie was called as a juror in a murder trial. Id. at 576. During voir dire, Currie
was asked if he had ever dealt with the district attorney's office. Id. At that time it was discovered
that Currie's brother had recently been murdered and as a result, Currie had built up some prejudices
against the district attorney's office. Id. Currie was subsequently dismissed as a juror. Id. However,
as Currie made his way out, passing near the defense table, he remarked to the defendant "I hope they
hang you." Id. at 577. The defense attorney reported the statement to the trial court which stated that
it had heard the remark as well. Id. As a result, the court imposed a $1,000 fine on Currie. Id.
214. Id. at 579. In examining section 785.03(2) (comparable to N.D. CENT. CODE §
-27-10-01.3(2)), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated that:
"fr]ead in its entirety, we are uncertain whether the statute requires an ongoing state of
disorder or disruption as a condition precedent to the summary imposition of a punitive
sanction, or whether a disruption which has terminated, nevertheless, still permits the
summary imposition of such a sanction."
Id.
215. Id. at 581. The Wisconsin Supreme Court later upheld this ruling, quoting extensively from
the appellate court's discussion. Currie v. Schwalbach, 407 N.W.2d 862, 867-868 (Wis. 1987).
216. See Currie, 407 N.W.2d at 865-868 (establishing when summary procedures are available);
State v. Levin, 430 N.W.2d 718, 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (reversing the lower court's use of summary
proceedings because the contemptuous act did not occur in the court's actual presence).
217. Currie, 867 N.W.2d at 865-868.
218. Id. at 866 (emphasis added). The Currie court also concluded that contemptuous conduct
need not be ongoing for summary procedure to be used, stating that a "contempt which consists of a
single act that aborts the entire proceedings ... is no less a threat to order than a series of disruptive
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The ultimate result of the Currie holding was that it raised the issue
of when an act did or did not occur in the "actual presence" of a court. 219
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals dealt with this question in two separate
cases. 220 In both cases, the court reversed the lower court's contempt
order, finding the use of summary procedures improper because the
contemnor was not in the court's "actual presence." 22 1 Neither of these
cases, however, provided a' clear . definition of the term "actual presence".
Subsequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court provided the answer in In re
M.P.222 There, the court concluded that an act occurs in a court's actual
presence "when the contempt is committed in the courtroom while court
proceedings are taking place." 223 Thus, any action so occurring may be
proceeded against summarily.
The final area of confusion for Wisconsin courts, and the most
recent of the three, has been the application of punitive and remedial
sanctions. 224 The difficulty here seems to have come about largely from
judicial misunderstanding as to the remedial nature of the sanction
imposed. In one case, for example, the contemnor was held in contempt
for violating the provisions of an order to pay child support. 225 As its
sanction, the court ordered the contemnor to serve "a thirty-day jail
actions which result in the proceedings being briefly interrupted or which merely threaten to interrupt
proceedings." Id.
219. Id. See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 785.03(2) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-10-01.3(2)
(establishing the summary procedure to impose a punitive sanction only when the contemptuous act
occurs in the court's actual presence).
220. State v. Levin, 430 N.W.2d 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), State v. Lemmons, 437 N.W.2d 224
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
221. Levin, 430 N.W.2d at 718. In Levin, a witness named Casey failed to comply with a
subpoena to testify as a witness. Id. He did, however, appear before the court the next morning to
explain his failure to comply. Id. Casey explained that he had been in Chicago celebrating his
birthday "and that his ride back to Wisconsin reneged at the last moment." Id. As a result, Casey had
to take the train home which did not get him back in time to appear. Id. at 719. After hearing this
testimony, the court summarily found him in contempt. Id. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed
the court's order concluding that Casey's contemptuous act did not occur in the actual presence of the
court because the court did not have any personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
surrounding Casey's act. Id.
In Lenrnons, Lemmons was watching her husband's jury trial. At some point she got up and
went into the corridor where the witnesses were sequestered. 437 N.W.2d at 225. While there.
Lemmons called the district attorney a "lying bitch." and badgered some of the witnesses by calling
them names and threatening physical harm. Id. A police officer who witnessed her actions reported
them to the district attorney who requested that the officer make a report of the incident. Id. The next
day, while the district attorney was giving the closing argument, Lemmons stood up and shouted to the
jury "Oh. shit" and stormed out of the building. Id. Thereafter, the court was also informed of
Lemmons antics of the previous day. Id. Thus, when Lemmons later returned to the courtroom, the
court summarily imposed a contempt order against her. Id. On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals reversed that portion of the court's order which related to the incident in the corridor stating
that the court did not have personal knowledge of what had occurred. Id. at 227.
222. 452 N.W.2d 354.
223. In re M.P., 452 N.W.2d 354,358 (Wis. 1990).
224. See, e.g, State ex rel. N.A. v. G.S.. 456 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990); In re Marriage of
Larsen, 478 N.W.2d 18 (Wis. 1992).
225. State ex rel. N.A. v. G.S., 456 N.W.2d at 868.
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sentence without work release privileges." 226  The court provided,
however, that the contemnor could purge the thirty-day sanction by
finding and holding a job.227 On appeal, the lower court's order was
reversed. 228 The appellate court found that, as the order stood, the
contemnor could not purge the contempt because he could not be
released from jail to find a job.229 Moreover, the court questioned that
portion of the order which required the contemnor to find and hold a
job, stating that hiring him was "the affirmative act of another" and not
"in the power of the contemnor." 230 This case establishes that confusion
still remains under the statute regarding classification.
Because North Dakota's new contempt law is patterned so closely
after Wisconsin's, it is reasonable to conclude that similar challenges will
be made in North Dakota. Moreover, it appears likely that some
difficulty and confusion will still remain for North Dakota's courts under
the new contempt scheme. However, because of the groundwork that
Wisconsin's courts have laid, North Dakota's experience may be a bit
gentler.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1993, the North Dakota Legislature enacted legislation in an
attempt to eliminate several problems relating to its contempt of court
laws. 231 Three problems were identified by the North Dakota Supreme
Court's Joint Procedure Committee. 232 First, the Committee found that
confusion resulted because North Dakota's contempt laws were contained
in more than one area of the Century Code. 233 Second, the Committee
believed that the need for two hearings in contempt cases where the
accused was brought before the court on a warrant of attachment or
order to show cause was burdensome and unnecessary. 234 Finally, the
Committee found that much of the judicial confusion surrounding
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 870.
229. Id.
230. State ex rel. N.A.. 456 N.W.2d at 870.
231. N.D. CENr. CODE ch. 27-10.1 (Supp. 1993). See also 1993 N.D. Laws Chapter 89, § 1.
232. See supra section Ill(B) (discussing the problems found to exist under previous North
Dakota law).
233. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text (discussing the problems resulting from
having the contempt laws contained in more than one chapter of the North Dakota Century Code).
234. See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text (discussing the problems resulting from
requirement of more than one contempt hearing in certain cases).
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contempt could be removed by eliminating the need to classify
contempts as civil or criminal. 235
The new legislation addresses these problems first by adopting an
approach similar to the one taken by Wisconsin in 1980.236 Under this
approach, civil and criminal contempts are abandoned and replaced by
the single term "contempt of court." 237 By eliminating civil and criminal
contempts in North Dakota, the statute goes far in eliminating much of
the confusion which existed under previous law. Thus, by having only
one type of contempt, the court will no longer be forced to participate in
mental gymnastics, trying to differentiate actions which, in all likelihood,
could be classified as either civil or criminal. In addition to eliminating
much of the confusion, the new statute also lessens the risk that proper
procedural safeguards will not be applied when sanctioning a contem-
nor. This is done by requiring that, where a court finds contemptuous
actions to have occurred, the court must make an immediate determina-
tion as to whether it will seek to impose punitive or remedial sanctions.238
This determination is very important, for it will determine the type of
procedure which the court must apply in sanctioning the contempt. 239
Thus, the court is required to undertake a procedural determination at
the outset so that the contemnor's due process rights are not compro-
mised.240
An examination of Wisconsin's experience reveals that North
Dakota courts may encounter some problems. 241 The first of these
problems results from the manner in which the statute is written.
Because the statute seeks to maintain the previous substantive contempt
law, the new law is written in a broad and general manner. 242 This has
resulted in several challenges made to contempt rulings claiming
ambiguity in the statutory language. 243 While none of these challenges
have threatened the vitality of Wisconsin's statute, 244 it is possibile that
235. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text (examining the confusion created by
requiring courts to differentiate civil and criminal contempts).
236. See supra section III(C)(1) (discussing North Dakota's adoption of a scheme that eliminates
the need to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt).
237. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of contempt under
North Dakota's new law).
238. See supra notes 151-53 (discussing contempt proceedings procedures).
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See supra section IV (discussing Wisconsin's experiences since it adopted its version of the
contempt scheme).
242. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of contempt under
the new law).
243. See supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text (discussing challenges to Wisconsin's




such a claim may be stated. Thus, the new statute may be subject to
claims of overbreadth. Wisconsin courts have also had difficulty in
determining when acts occur in the "actual presence" of the court, a
requirement necessary for use of summary procedures under the
statute.245 However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed the issue in
1990, and since that time the question of actual presence seems to have
been resolved. 246 Finally, Wisconsin's courts have also experienced some
difficulty in differentiating between remedial and punitive sanctions. 247
Thus, some risk may remain that the court will apply improper
procedural safeguards in sanctioning a contemnor.
Turning next to the changes made to address issues of consolida-
tion,248 it would appear that the changes made directly address the Joint
Procedure Committee's concerns and should be fairly certain in their
application. The new law places all of the contempt law procedure into
one chapter of the North Dakota Century Code. This change should
make the new contempt laws rather simple to find and use, eliminating
any confusion which may previously have arisen. Additionally, the
requirement of two contempt proceedings in certain instances has also
been eliminated. By doing so, the legislature has eliminated judicial
waste and made the contempt procedures universal in their application.
Despite the potential problem areas, one must conclude that the new
contempt statute is an improvement on previous North Dakota law. By
forcing the court to make a procedural determination at an early stage,
much of the risk is removed that a court's order will be reversed on
appeal. More importantly, contemnors will generally not be deprived of
their due process rights during the contempt proceedings. In addition,
the reclassification of contempt as merely "contempt of court" will
eliminate much of the confusion that the necessity of pigeonholing
certain acts as either one type of contempt or another has caused. While
no legislative action will ever be free from weakness, the legislation
245. See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving the actual
presence requirement).
246. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of actual
presence).
247. See supra notes 226-30 (discussing the problem of sanctions).
248. See supra section III(C)(2) (discussing the legislative changes made to consolidate North
Dakota's contempt law).
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enacted by the North Dakota Legislature in 1993 to address problems
surrounding the state's contempt laws should go far in eliminating much
of the confusion that has surrounded contempt law for centuries. Just
how far is yet to be seen.
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